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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE
ENFORCEMENT OF SIZE AND WEIGHT REGULATIONS
Plaintiff motor carrier was engaged in interstate commerce, holding
a certificate of convenience- and necessity from the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Pursuant to a state statute, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 9532, §229
(b) (1953), Illinois sought to suspend the carrier's right to use the state
highways after plaintiff had repeatedly violated state size and weight regu-
lations set forth, id. §228. Plaintiff brought action against the Attorney
General of Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that such a sanction
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The lower court
entered judgment adverse to the carrier. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed. 2 ll. 2d 58, 117 N.E. 2d 106 (1954). On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed. State power to sus-
pend interstate motor carriers from the highways has been superseded by
the federal government under the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Castle v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
Matters of interstate commerce which do not require national uni-
formity may be regulated by the states as long as the federal government
has not elected to exercise its paramount power. When supersedure oc-
curs, Congressional pre-emption of the field may be partial or it may be
complete. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
Determination of the degree of pre-emption presents difficult questions
of Congressional intent, as is attested by developments in state and federal
regulation of motor carriers. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
The scope of state authority to regulate motor carriers in interstate
commerce was greatly restricted by passage of the Motor Carrier Act,
49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§301-327 (1952). This act gave
the Interestate Commerce Commission authority to issue certificates of
convenience and necessity to interstate motor carriers and to further regu-
late the industry by establishing requirements with respect to "continuous
and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform
systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifi-
cations and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety and
operation of equipment." 49 STAT. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §304(a)
(1952). To this extent, therefore, state regulatory power was precluded.
Section 325 of the act authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to
"investigate and report" on the need for federal regulation of sizes and
weight of motor vehicles covered by the act. This provision has been
held to be a reservation from the power granted to the commission in
§304(a), leaving the states free to regulate sizes and weight of motor
carriers. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 611 (1940).
Congress still has not elected to regulate the sizes and weight of
vehicles moving in interstate commerce. An Illinois statute imposing
maximum gross weight limitations and regulations regarding weight dis-
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tribution on axles of motor vehicles using the state highways was held
to be a reasonable exercise of the state police power and not violative of
the commerce clause. Werner Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 19 F. Supp. 425
(N.D. Ill. 1937). In 1951 a new penalty provision was added to this
Illinois statute. That provision provides, upon conviction for violation of
the regulations, a fine which is graduated according to the amount of the
overload. After ten such convictions within a year, the state may bring an
action to suspend for ninety days the violator's privilege of using the
state's highways. If ten more convictions follow at any time thereafter,
a year's suspension can be imposed. The Supreme Court in the instant
case unanimously affirmed the decision of the Werner Transt. Co. case,
supra, that such regulations were valid, but it declared unconstitutional the
provision allowing suspension for violation of the regulations. Although
the state weight limitations in themselves did not conflict with the Motor
Carrier Act, the suspension provision infringed upon the federal power to
decide what vehicles covered by the act shall operate in interstate com-
merce. The federal government had superseded the former state power to
control their highways in this manner by restricting the right to engage in
interstate commerce to those motor carriers which held certificates of con-
venience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
49 STAT. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §306 (1952).
This decision removes the most effective means available to the
states for enforcement of their size and weight regulations. It can be
expected that fines for violations will be paid by the larger motor car-
riers as part of the expense of operating in states which have relatively
low size and weight limitations. Evidently the respondent in the prin-
cipal case was not deterred by the prospect of paying fines, for it had been
charged with 301 minor violations of the Illinois statute. The difficulty
with imposing a fine severe enough to force the motor carriers to observe
the regulations is that it might be invalidated for attempting by indirection
what the suspension provision of the Illinois statute cannot constitutionally
do directly. The suggestion of Justice Black in the principal case is for
the states to rely on a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion which requires motor carriers to abide by valid state highway regu-
lations. 49 C.F.R. § 192.3 (Cum. Supp. 1954). If a carrier fails to do
this, the Interstate Commerce Commission can revoke its certificate. 49
STAT. 555 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §312 (1952). If this enforcement pro-
cedure proves ineffectual, Congress may have to adopt uniform size and
weight regulations.
Dirken T. Voelker
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-STATE TAxATION OF GRoss RECEIPTS
FROM INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Complainant, a Delaware corporation, instituted action in an Illinois
court to enjoin the state treasurer from paying into the state treasury
certain monies collected from complainant pursuant to a state gross receipts
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assessment. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 120 §467.17. Complainant transported
gas, via pipeline, from Louisiana to Illinois where it sold the gas to utilities
companies for direct consumption. Prior to sale, the gas was stored in pipe-
lines, by the use of high pressure techniques, but no physical change was
wrought on it. Illinois levied a charge on the gross receipts derived from
these transactions within the state confines. The corporation asserted its
activities constituted a type of interstate commerce and were thus beyond
the constitutional reach of state taxing power. Agreeing, in an opinion
reminiscent of the famous Cooley case, the Supreme Court of llinois
ruled the sales to be in interstate commerce and invalidated the assessment.
The court rejected the theory that a state might levey on an interstate
transaction if the tax statute were so constructed as to eliminate the con-
tingency of multiple burden. Two judges, dissenting, felt the tax was on
an intrastate transaction since the sale was for consumption and did not
contemplate a resale by the buyers. Alternatively, the dissenters inclined
to the view which holds valid a state charge on interstate commerce if the
taxing state possesses sufficient contact with the activity or if such levy be
apportioned to coincide with the quantum of state contact. Mississippi
River Fuel Corp. v. Hoffman, --- Ill. ___, 123 N.E. 2d 503 (1955).
That these sales were interstate in character admits of no serious
dispute. Although there are earlier decisions to the contrary, it is now
consistently held that a sale across state lines upon a buyer's order is inter-
state commerce although no resale is contemplated. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U.S. 507 (1947);
Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
The East Ohio case held that whether the sale be for direct consumption
or for resale it is interstate; earlier opinions had ruled a sale for direct
consumption intrastate in essence. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission
of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465 (1931). Looking more to effect than to esoteric
distinctions the Court, of late, has been reluctant to designate a point in
time or space which differentiates interstate from intrastate activity.
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U.S. 682
(1947). The majority of the court, in the instant litigation, was correct
in designating the sales interstate commerce.
The question then becomes whether a state may ever tax gross receipts
from an interstate activity in an area requiring national uniformity and,
if so, upon what contingencies the power rests. From the date of the Cooley
Compromise until opinions of late-1930 vintage the Court unequivocally
took the position that .states might not levy on transactions designated
interstate even when such charges were apportioned to the amount of
business done within the taxing state's confines. Fishers Blend Station
Inc. v. State Tax Commission. 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
With the coming of Western Live Stock Co. v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938), a new concept made its debut into this field. Mr.
justice Stone, by way of dictum, indicated in the Western Live Stock
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decision that a gross receipts tax upon interstate commerce would be
validated if apportioned. A subsequent decision, again by way of dictum,
gave added impetus to the idea that a method might be achieved to obviate
the harshness of the Cooley doctrine. Adams Manufacturing Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). The theory advanced in support of such
an apportionment concept derived from the fact that such levies are, by
their nature, incapable of being repeated-if each state were to tax only
the amount of business done within its confines the possibility of multiple
state burden on interstate commerce would be eliminated. Unapportioned
gross receipts levies clearly continued in disfavor. Gwin, White and
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
The nascent concept of apportioned gross receipts taxation appeared
to receive collateral support from decisions involving state taxation of
interstate sales. Upheld was an assessment by the State of New York
upon sales of goods shipped from outstate on buyer's orders. McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); McGoldrick v.
Felt Tarrant Manufacturing Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940). Faced with the
contention that the McGoldrick cases permitted multiple state taxation,
the Court later made clear that it had vested only the state of destination
with power to levy on interstate sales. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249
(1946). There, the state of origin, Indiana, was prohibited from taxing
an interstate sale which terminated in New York. Meantime, the Court
had appended to the privilege accorded the state of destination, the further
qualification that the receiving jurisdiction must also possess a superior
incidence of contact with the transaction. McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S.
327 (1944), denied Arkansas' taxing power when the contract arose,
delivery was made, and title passed in another state. In designating one
state as privileged to tax, the Court had apparently borrowed a page from
an outmoded conflict of laws doctrine which designated as controlling, the
law of the state having the most significant contact with a transaction
occurring in several states. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
It was clear after the McLeod opinion, that a state possessed the requisite
constitutional power to tax an interstate sale if it were the place of desti-
nation and a sufficient number of the incidents of sale obtained within its
borders.
Despite McLeod's restrictive effect, the newer decisions on state
taxation of interstate sales accepted the premise that the constitutional
interdiction lay, not in any taxation of interstate commerce, but in the
hazard of multiple tax burden upon that commerce. Multiple burden is as
quickly avoided by apportionment of a total taxable transaction among
several states as by choice of a single jurisdiction with full taxing power.
But although the Court had a clear opportunity to validate an apportioned
gross receipts assessment in Joseph v. Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S.
422 (1947), it declined to do so. In the Weekes decision, a New York
company, whose interstate activities were totally confined within the state,
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was freed from the obligation of paying a clearly apportioned gross
receipts levy. The apportionment doctrine as expounded by Stone was not
yet dead however, since the apportionment faction of the Court later
sustained a tax similar to the one invalidated in the Weekes case. Four
members of the court were willing to rest the decision on an apportion-
ment concept but the concurrence of Mr. Justice Burton, who conceived
the transaction to be intrastate, was needed to uphold the tax. Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949). Any doubts as to the
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), wherein an apportioned
gross receipts tax was struck down, and Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
gross receipts tax was struck down, and Spector Motor Serzice Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) which disallowed an apportioned net
receipts tax. The Spector opinion disavowed the apportionment doctrine
eo nomine. Whatever may be said of the doctrine, it is an inescapable
legal fact that it is not the law.
The Illinois court was unquestionably correct, in the instant litiga-
tion, in categorizing the taxed sales as interstate commerce. In light of
the recent decisions, it therefore correctly dismissed apportionment as
interesting theory but poor law. Nevertheless, in view of the regularity
with which dissents accompany the decisions in this field of law, the
dissenting Illinois judges can find some solace in the possibility that future
judicial convolutions may yet result in the employment of the eminently
sensible apportionment concept to exorcize the Cooley dilemma.
William Franklin Sherman
CONTEMPT--TAKING PHOTOGRAPH AGAINST JUDGE'S ORDERS
During an arraignment on an indictment in the common pleas court,
a photograph was taken by a newspaper photographer at the direction of
the city editor. This was contrary to and in direct disobedience of the
express order of the judge then sitting. The photographer, city editor
and a reporter were all cited for contempt. The court of appeals affirmed
the judgment. 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N.E. 2d 853. On appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court, held, the deliberate disobedience of a court's order
reasonably necessary to maintain order and prevent unnecessary disturbance
and distraction constitutes a contempt of court. Ohio v. Clifford, 162
Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E. 2d 8 (1954).
The earliest reported case dealing with the power of a judge to cite
a photographer for contempt for the taking of photographs in the court-
room is Ex Parte Sturm, et al, 152 Md. 114, 136 At1. 312, (1927).
Here, immediately before a trial on a murder indictment, the judge an-
nounced that he would not allow any pictures to be taken in the court-
room. A newspaper photographer, under the direction of his city editor,
secretly took pictures of the trial with a small camera. After the publication
of the pictures, the judge cited the manager, editors, city editor and two
photographers of the newspaper for contempt. In upholding the citation,
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the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the duty of a court to
afford ample scope to the liberty of the press, but stated that this should
not be carried to the point where it would become an undue encroachment
on the power' of judicial tribunals to enforce their own judgment as to
what conduct is incompatible with the proper and orderly course of their
procedure.
Again in Matter of Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y.S. 615 (1931),
a newspaper photographer was adjudged in contempt for exploding a
flashbulb in the court-house corridor, 100 feet from the courtroom, for
the purpose of photographing a prisoner about to enter the courtroom.
The court here felt that the molestation of prisoners 'by photographers
might lead to riots or other disorders which would aid the prisoners in
escaping. Further, reasoned the court, the noise creates a disturbance of
the court and may cause crowding outside the courtroom doors.
However, both of these cases were decided before the First Amend-
ment guaranties of free speech and free press were held by the Supreme
Court of the United States to be applicable to the states -by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See George Foster, Jr., The 1931 Personal
Liberties Cases 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 64 (1932). Moreover they pre-
ceded in time even more recent Supreme Court decisions which dispel
former doubts as to whether judicial action can be violative of substantive
as well as procedural due process. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); d.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). These major constitutional developments require a
revaluation of the power of courts to commit for contempt those who seek
by picture or word, to convey to the public the events occurring in judicial
proceedings.
The gathering of news and its dissemination by written word is
clearly within the guaranty of freedom of the press. GrosJean v. imeri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). After much uncertainty, the motion
picture has now been held to 'be a medium of expression also within the
constitutional guaranty. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). In-
asmuch as the newspaper photograph is likewise a means of transmitting
information, closely linked to the traditional medium of the news article,
it would seem that it is also encompassed by the guaranty.
Once a medium of expression is found to be within the guaranty of
freedom of speech and of the press, only a substantial public interest will
justify governmental interference or restriction. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931). In one of its major contempt of court decisions,
a divided United States Supreme Court declared that abridgement of the
constitutional freedom can occur only where the exercise of the freedom
creates a clear and present danger to the due administration of justice.
Bridge v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). However, in Fisher v. Pace,
336 U.S. 155 (1949), a bare majority of the Supreme Court sustained a
contempt order against a Texas attorney for continued reference, in his
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argument to the jury, to matters which had been withheld from the jury
by stipulation, holding that the power of courts to punish contempt in
their presence without further proof of facts and without the aid of a
jury is looked upon as being essential to preserve their authority and to
pre-vent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute. This
gives the impression that the Supreme Court does not require an overriding
public interest evidenced by a clear and present danger or a substantial
interference with the administration of justice in the case of courts
punishing contempt in their presence.
If, in the principal case, the photographer, in his efforts to take a
photograph, had in some way inconvenienced the judge, or if the taking
of these photographs would in some manner aid in the escape of prisoners,
or if the pictures were to be printed in some fashion which would make
the judge appear ridiculous, clearly these activities would be given no
constitutional protection. But, seemingly, the taking of a picture by a
method whereby no one would be disturbed and where there is no criticism
of the court nor any attempt to influence, persuade or intimidate it, would
now be a protected activity.
The freedom allowed the press in the country has never been con-
strued so broadly as to allow photographs or reporters to make a mockery
out of a trial. If the grinding of T.V. cameras, the popping of flashbulbs,
or the scurrying about of the cameramen or photograhers should cause
such a disturbance that the orderly administration of justice could no
longer be achieved there can be no doubt that the court can put an end
to the disorder. It would seem that with the increasing advance of modern
photography it will be possible to obtain cameras perfected in such a way
as to cause absolutely no disturbance in the courtroom. In this event, it
would be difficult to perceive just what possible grounds for objecting
to their use could be advanced by the court.
Robert Hill
INsURANE-DUTY TO DEFEND ACTION AGAINST INSURED
Plaintiff contracted with the defendant for liability insurance to
indemnify accidents occurring in plaintiff's establishment. The policy
provided that assault and battery was to be construed as an accident un-
less committed by or at the direction of the plaintiff, and that the defend-
ant would defend any suit for which indemnity is assured by the policy,
even though such suits be false, groundless or fraudulent. One Lees
brought suit against plaintiff alleging he sustained injury by plaintiff's
assault and battery. Defendant refused to defend. Plaintiff, to avoid
bad publicity, settled the case and brought this action under the policy to
recover the amount of the settlement. The trial court entered judgment
for plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, three judges
dissenting. Held, whether an insurer is required to defend a cause of
action against insured is to be determined by whether the petition against
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the insured stated a cause of action covered -by the terms of the policy.
Wilson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A. 2d 304 (1954).
This type of clause is not uncommon in insurance policies. One of
the first decisions construing a duty to defend was Union Indemnity Co.
v. Mostor, 41 Ohio App. 518, 181 N.E. 495 (1932). In that case the
insurer contracted to indemnify for loss by reason of ownership, mainte-
nance or use of an automobile by those who are legally qualified to drive;
the court held that the insurer's duty to defend was absolute even though
the driver was 16 years of age and a city ordinance required drivers to
be 18 years of age. The court said the clause in the policy was an un-
conditional promise to defend suits for damages alleged to be caused by
insured's automobile.
However, a subsequent Ohio case took a different approach. In
Luchte v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Ohio App. 5, 197 N.E. 421
(1935), the policy covered loss caused by use, maintenance, ownership
or operation of a coal delivery truck. The driver of the truck dumped
the coal on the street before dawn and subsequently a motorcyclist was
killed by running into the coal pile. In an action brought by the decedent's
estate, the insurer refused to defend. The court held that the insurer is
not obligated to defend actions not covered by the insurance contract.
The insurer must defend false or groundless actions covered 'by the in-
surance policy, but this does not mean the insurer is required to defend
actions not covered by the insurance policy. This view was supported in
Ruby Gilmore v. Royal Indemnity Co., 31 Ohio St. 287, 62 N.E. 2d 90
(1945).
Obviously, the protection afforded by a policy of the type involved
in the principal case provides a valuable benefit to the insured. Under the
exclusionary clause the insurer is required to indemnify the insured for his
liability for assault and battery committed by third persons who aren't
acting under the direction of the insured. Thus, indemnification would
apply to cases where an employee commits an assault and battery on a
third person where such employee acted in the course of his employment
for the furtherance of the employer's business. Rouda v. Lowry & Goebel
Co., 9 Ohio App. 91, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 294 (1917). In addition, in-
demnification would cover situations where the proprietor failed to exercise
ordinary care, which would have prevented an assault and battery upon
a patron. Thus the proprietor might incur liability for an assault and
battery committed on a patron by another patron. Moon v. Conley,
9 Ohio App. 16, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 14 (1918).
These cases focus on the question whether the injured person's com-
plaint against the insured states a cause of action covered by the terms of
the policy. If so, the insurer must defend irrespective of the fact that
the suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent. Casaulty Co. v. Headers,
118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 282 (1928). The Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline
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Co. v. Union Indenmity Co., 121 Ohio St. 220, 167 N.E. 884 (1929).
8 APPLEMAN, INS. LAW AND PRACTICE §4683 (1st ed. 1941).
In determining the insurer's obligation to defend, the language of
the insurance contract must first be construed, then the allegations of the
complaint against the insured must be interpreted to determine if the action
is covered by the contract. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafer,
35 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Ohio 1940). Where the terms of the policy are
ambiguous, the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured. McAllister
v. Century Indem. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.
2d 345 (1953). Boyle v. National Gas. Co., No. 1132 D.C. Ct. of App.,
84 A. 2d 614 (1951). The insured in the principal case does not benefit
from this rule as the exclusionary clause "unless committed by or at the
direction of the insured" is not ambiguous. In fact, Lees' allegation that
the insured struck him with a black-jack is squarely within the terms of
the exclusionary clause.
The insured plaintiff in the principal case contended that he should
be given the opportunity to prove that he did not commit the alleged as-
sault and -battery. He had that opportunity in the suit brought against him;
however, in a suit brought by him against the insurer, the latter's duty to
defend depends on the pertinent policy provisions. The insured has the
opportunity in the present case to show that the allegations against him do
come within the terms of the policy. This is all the courts allowed in the
cases on which the plaintiff now relies. Knorr v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co., 171 Pa. Super. 488, 90 A. 2d 387 (1952). Springfield Township
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 461, 64 A. 2d 761
(1949). The lower court and the dissenting judges placed much weight
on University Club v. Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Boston, 124 Pa.
Super. 480, 189 A. 534 (1937) wherein the terms of the policy promised
to indemnify the insured against liability for damages on account of in-
juries to those legally employed by the insured. The injured employee's
complaint was based on the defective condition of an elevator and in-
cidentally stated that the employee was 17 years of age (only those 18
years of age could legally be employed). The insured recovered from
the insurer after the latter's refusal to defend because the injured person
based his cause of action on the defective condition of the elevator and did
not aver, or specifically rely on any illegal employment. Thus the insured
was allowed to show, without thereby introducing any new matter not
stated in the complaint, that the employee was in fact 18 years of age.
In the principal case, the fact which the insured wants to show would
change the nature of the cause of action from a willful tort to one based
on negligence.
Application of these considerations to the present case shows that it
would make no sense for an insurance company to defend a suit for which
it could incur no liability. If the suit brought by Lees had gone to trial,
regardless of the outcome the insurer would not have been liable for the
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judgment. If Lees had received judgment, it would have been on grounds
excluded by the terms of the policy. Thus the duty to defend is correlative
with the duty to pay a judgment which may be obtained against the in-
sured in the suit brought by the third party. 8 APPLEMAN, INs. LAW AND
PRACTICE §4684 (1st ed. 1941).
Although at first -blush it seems that the insured's claim against the
inurer is not without merit, "There is," as the Pennsylvania court said,
"no authority in any jurisdiction to support plaintiff's position." If the
facts were as plaintiff claimed them to be, he settled a groundless claim,
and for such a settlement the insurer would not be liable. The insurance
company contracted to defend false claims-but it did not agree to defend
any such claims. It contracted to defend groundless claims which stated
facts coming within the terms of the policy. It is submitted that the court
reached a correct decision in holding that an insurance company has no
duty to defend an action which it did not agree in the contract to defend.
Richard D. Schwab
LABOR LAw-DuTY TO BARGAIN-ONE-YEAR CERTIFICATION RULE
The National Labor Relations Board conducted a representation
election in petitioner's Chrysler-Plymouth agency. Local No. 727, Inter-
national Association of Machinists, won by a vote of eight to five. A week
after the election, and one day before the union's certification by the Labor
Board as exclusive bargaining representative of petitioner's employees,
petitioner received a handwritten letter signed by nine of his thirteen
employees, repudiating the union as their bargaining agent. Relying on
this clear proof of the union's loss of majority status, petitioner refused
to bargain with the union. The Labor Board found petitioner had thereby
committed an unfair labor practice under Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5)
of the amended National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§158(a) (1),
158(a) (5), and ordered him to bargain. Ray Brooks and International
Association of Machinists for its District Lodge No..727, 98 N.L.R.B.
976 (1952). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the
Board's order to bargain. National Labor Relations Board v. Brooks, 204
F. 2d 899 (9th Cir. 1953). The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Brooks v. National Labor Relations Board 347 U.S. 916
(1954). Held: Order affirmed. Brooks v. National Labor Relations
Board, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
The National Labor Relations Board, in the disposition of repre-
sentation cases, is constantly struggling to reconcile two conflicting policies
set out in Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
On the one hand, it seeks to stabilize employer-employee relations in order
to facilitate the uninterrupted flow of commerce. On the other hand, it
strives to guarantee to workers the right to be represented by agents of
their own choosing. In compromising these two policies, the Board has
attempted to preserve the essentials of each. A long line of Board de-
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cisions has promulgated the rule that the certification of a union following
a Board-conducted election must be honored for a reasonable period,
usually one year. Monarch Aluminum Mfg. Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1
(1942); Bohn Alurinuz and Brass Corporation, 57 N.L.R.B. 1684
(1944); Motor Valve and Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1944);
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 90 (1945).
Certain "unusual circumstances" prompted the Board, before the
Taft-Hartley Act was passed, to deviate from the usual rule--(1) when
the certified union dissolved or became defunct, Public Service Electric
& Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944); (2) when, as a result of a schism
within the union, substantially all the members and officers of the certified
union transferred their affiliation to a new local or international, Carson
Pire Scott & Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946); and (3) when the size of
the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time, Westinghouse
Electric & Mfg. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 404 (1942).
In 1947 Congress placed greater emphasis upon the stability of
labor-management relations by incorporating in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act a provision limiting the num-
ber of representation elections in a particular bargaining unit to one an-
nually, §9(c) (3) of the amended National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §15 9 (c) (3), and permitting certification only after an election,
§9 (c) (1) of the amended National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§159(c) (1). The arguments are strong that this legislative policy sub-
stantially vindicated the Board's "one-year certification" rule. Yet the
courts were not consistent in supporting the Board in the enforcement of
this rule. In a few cases involving a fact pattern comparable to that in the
principal case, the courts reversed the Board's order requiring recognition
for a period of a year. National Labor Relations Board v. Vulcan Forging
Co., 188 F. 2d 927 (6th Cir. 1951); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 204 F. 2d 613 (6th Cir. 1953).
One case refused to accept one year as the inexorable rule, holding that
a period of 49 weeks was a reasonable period. National Labor Relations
Board v. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 199 F. 2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1952).
The Supreme Court had previously held that an employer was
obligated to bargain with the union for a reasonable time, despite its loss
of majority status, if the diminution in its ranks was attributable to the
employer's unfair labor practice. Frank Bros. Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). But in the instant case there
was no evidence that an unfair practice on the part of the employer had
encouraged the workers to abandon their union.
The court in the principal case undertook to resolve the uncertainty
that had been created by conflicting circuit court decisions on the issue
here presented. It was argued by the petitioner that forcing employees to
bargain through a representative they had repudiated would be depriving
them of their right to bargain through a representative of their own
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choice, which is guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §157. But the court felt that §9(c) (1) of the
amended National Labor Relations Act, supra, must have contemplated
that certification would have a certain minimum duration, for without
such a period of grace it would have very little practical effect. And
cogent policy considerations dictated this determination. Giving the union
a minimum tenure encourages the making of a solemn and considered
choice at the election, stabilizes industrial relations, reduces inter-union
conflicts, renders more manageable the resolution of representation ques-
tions, and gives to the certified union a reasonable opportunity to negotiate
favorable terms for the employees it represents. The Supreme Court was
persuaded by these arguments to give force to the certification for some
period of time. The court specifically held that it was within the power
of the Board to require that its certification be honored for a reasonable
period despite the union's loss of a majority, and that the Board has not
abused its discretion by designating one year as reasonable.
After one year has elapsed, the Board has held that an employer may
legally refuse to bargain with the union if he has fair doubts about its
continuing majority. Celanese Corporation of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664
(1951). But such a practice has also been held to be evidence of bad
faith. United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950). Since the
state of the law on this point is unsettled, an employer who feels that his
duty to 'bargain is moot can fully protect himself only by continuing to
bargain with the certified union, or filing a petition under Section 9 (c)
(1) (B) of the amended National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§159(c) (1) (B).
But for one year there is no doubt of the employer's duty. The
instant case declares that the employer must bargain with the certified
union for such period, despite the union's loss of majority status, in the
absence of the "unusual circumstances." The Board has consistently en-
forced this rule, and it now has the judicial sanction of the Supreme Court.
Dazid G. Sherman
TORTs-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF MuNICIPAL ORDINANCE
Action by plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries suffered
when his motorcycle collided with defendant's automobile. Plaintiff al-
leged the automobile was, at the time of the collision, being driven in a
negligent manner by a thief. Defendant had left the automobile on a
street in San Francisco, unattended and unlocked, with the ignition key in
the switch in violation of a local ordinance which prohibited the leaving of
an automobile in such a manner but provided that evidence of violation of
the ordinance should not be admissible in a civil action. Held: The ordi-
nance is not admissible to show negligence and eliminating the contended
effect of the ordinance the petition alleging negligence based upon the
remaining facts stated above is insufficient to state a cause of action.
Richards v. Stanley 271 P. 2d 23 (Cal., 1954).
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It is a well established rule that in order for a person to recover
damages for injuries on the theory that his injuries resulted from de-
fendant's negligence, he must show that the defendant owed a duty of
care to him at the time he sustained the injuries. Newlin v. New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 316 Mass. 234, 54 N.E. 2d 929 (1944);
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A. 2d 792 (1950); Chatterton v.
Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480, 223 P. 2d 389 (1950); 38 AM. JUR.,
NEGLIGENCE §12; 65 C.J.S., NEGLIGENCE §2. Such a duty may be
shown to exist at common law or to have been created by a statute or
ordinance. Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 115 S.W. 2d 219 (Mo.
App. 1938); Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 170 P. 2d 454 (1946);
Milner Hotels v. Lyons, 302 Ky. 717, 196 S.W. 2d 364 (1946).
If a statute or ordinance creates a duty to protect persons or property,
some courts hold that violation of such a statute or ordinance is admissible
as prima facie or presumptive evidence of negligence. Tossman v. New-
man, 37 Cal. 2d 522, 233 P. 2d 1 (1951); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,
2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E. 2d 74 (1954); 38 AM. JtJR., NEGLIGENCE §158.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the Ney case, held that violation of a
uniform traffic act prohibiting the leaving of an automobile unattended
without first stopping the engine and removing the ignition key was prima
facie negligence. Despite the weight of authority to the contrary, how-
ever, at least one court has held that violation of a municipal ordinance
is not admissible as evidence of negligence. Ford Adm'r. v. Paducah
City Ry., 124 Ky. 488, 99 S.W. 355 (1907); See also Richmond v.
Warren Institution For Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 30 N.E. 2d 407 (1940).
The Kentucky court, indicating a different attitude, later held that evi-
dence of violation of a municipal ordinance passed pursuant to statutory
authority was admissible to show negligence. Louis'Ule and N.R. Co. v.
Louisville Provision Co. 212 Ky. 709, 279 S.W. 1100 (1926). A
majority of jurisdictions, however, including Ohio, hold that violation of
a safety statute or ordinance is negligence per se. Neave Bldg. Co. v.
Roudebush, 96 Ohio St. 40, 117 N.E. 22 (1917); Ross v. Hartman,
78 App. D.C. 217, 139 F. 2d 14 (1943); Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co.,
146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E. 2d 851 (1946); 38 AM. JUR., NEGLIGENCE
§§38, 42. The Ross case involved a District of Columbia statute which
prohibited leaving an automobile unlocked and unattended without first
removing the ignition keys. The court in that case held that violation of
an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence per se.
Both the Ross case and the Ney case, though of course not binding on
the California court, were urged by the plaintiff as precedents for the
general rule that evidence of the violation of the ordinance in the principal
case should be admissible to prove negligence. The court in the principal
case distinguished those cases, however, on the basis of the ordinances
involved, holding that there was a clear legislative intent that the ordinance
here involved should not be admissible in a civil action to show negligence.
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Having ruled out the admissibility of the ordinance, the question arose
as to whether the allegation that the defendant left her automobile on a
San Francisco street, unlocked and unattended with the keys in the igni-
tion, which action on the part of the defendant induced the thief to steal
the automobile, was a sufficient allegation to state a cause of action against
the defendant for injuries received as a result of the negligent operation
of the automobile by the thief. In the absence of such an ordinance or
statute requiring removal of ignition keys from parked vehicles, other
states have held that failure to do so does not, in itself, constitute negli-
gence. Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81 A. 2d 377 (1951);
Fulco v. City Ice Service 59 So. 2d 198 La. App. (1952); Kinsley v.
Von Atzingen, 20 N.J. Super. 378, 90 A. 2d 37 (1952). In order to
state a cause of action under the above facts the petition must allege that
the defendant anticipated, or should have anticipated, that there would
be an intermeddler. Kinsley v. Von Altzingen, supra. The Reti case,
supra, went so far as to hold that it did not constitute negligence for a
taxicab driver, who was waiting for the return of a drunken passenger,
to leave the ignition keys in the taxicab and walk past the drunken pas-
senger who was sitting at a bar, and go to the lavatory, during which time
the drunken passenger left the bar and drove away with the taxicab and
injured the plaintiff.
Failure to remove the ignition keys from a parked vehicle may con-
stitute negligence if it is reasonably forseeable that there may be an inter-
meddler, as where the person so leaving a vehicle had knowledge that
children were constantly playing in the street in the congested area where
the vehicle was left, Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N.Y.S.
20 (1928), af'd without opinion, 248 N.Y. 641, 162 N.E. 557 (1928)
or, where a taxicab driver knowingly leaves his cab with the ignition keys
therein and with an intoxicated person in the front seat. Morris v. Boling,
31 Tenn. App. 577, 217 S.W. 2d 754 (1948). Though it was urged to
accept the holding of Morris v. Boling, supra, as being applicable, the
court in the principal case held that the possibility that a negligent thief
will steal a parked vehicle left unattended on a San Francisco street with
the ignition keys therein is not sufficiently forseeable, standing alone, to
hold that the failure to remove the keys would constitute negligence. The
decision has support in the cases and it appears to be a reasonable one. If,
in the future, data indicate that the leaving of ignition keys in a parked
vehicle on a city street is sufficiently undesirable or dangerous, it has been
demonstrated to be within the power of legislative authority to provide that
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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-VACATION PERIOD-
UNION CONTRACT
Claimant was employed as a production worker in a plant where
the workers were given their annual vacation period under the provisions
of a union contract by which the plant was closed down during this period.
The claimant, a member of the union which was the bargaining agent for
his unit, was not entitled to a vacation with pay under the terms of the
agreement -because he had not had one year's service. He sought work in
other industrial plants in the area without success and then applied for
benefits under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act, Ohio Rev.
Code, c. 4141 (1345). The referee held that the claimant, through the
contract of his bargaining agent, had agreed to the vacation period and,
consequently, was voluntarily unemployed. This reasoning was adopted by
the Board of Review. The claimant appealed to the Common Pleas Court
for Trumbull County which reversed the decision of the Board of Review
on the grounds that the claimant was unemployed, not voluntarily, but
because of the inability of the employer to find work for him during the
vacation period. Yobe v. Sherwin-Williams Paint Co., 68 Ohio L. Abs.
260, 122 N.E. 2d 202 (1954).
The issue in the principal case has caused much confusion and many
conflicting state decisions. In his opinion the trial judge asserted that his
view reflects the weight of authority in this country, but research shows
that only five of eighteen reported cases have allowed compensation. See,
30 A.L.R. 2d 366-74 (1953), Benefit Series, Unemp. Comp., CCH-
Unemp. Ins. Rep.
The cases denying compensation have given various reasons. Bennett
v. Hix, ___ W. Va. ___, 79 S.E. 2d 114 (1954), did not allow com-
pensation -because the court said that there was a mass shutdown involved
and a voluntary act by the employee, but two cases disposed of in the
same opinion did allow compensation on the basis that the employees'
union had not agreed on a mass shutdown and therefore the employees
were involuntarily out of work. Accord, Beaman v. Bench 75 Ariz. 345,
256 P. 2d 721 (1953), Moen v. Director of Division of Unemployment,
324 Mass. 246, 85 N.E. 2d 779 (1952), denying compensation for the
same reasons as Bennett v. Hix. In the case of In re Buffelen Lumber
Mfg. Co., 32 Wash. 2d 205, 201 P. 2d 194 (1951), compensation was
denied and the court held that it was immaterial whether there was a
mass shutdown or just a staggered vacation. However, the rules in both
the Moen and Buffelen cases have been subsequently changed by statute
to allow compensation. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 151, §1, (r) (12) and
WAsH. REV. CODE c. 265, §12 (1951). In Jackson v. Minn. Honey-
well Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W. 2d 449 (1951), com-
pensation was denied despite the fact that the plant was closed for the
purpose both of taking inventory and a vacation period. American Central
Mfg. Co. v. Review Bd. of Indiana, 119 Ind. App. 430, 88 N.E. 2d 256
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(1952), denied compensation and held that even if the union acquiesced
indirectly to the vacation shutdown date, the employee was still held to
have voluntarily severed his employment. Some courts have held the
employee ineligible for compensation because he failed to seek other em-
ployment, arguing that he was not available for work as required by the
statute. Mattey v. Compensation Board, 164 Pa. Super 36, 63 A. 2d 429
(1954), Levey v. Todd Shipyard Corp. 279 App. Div. 947, 116 N.Y.S.
612 (1952).
Most Ohio cases have denied compensation. In Cambridge Glass
Co., Robert Adkins v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, CCH
UNEMP. INs. REP. §8411 (Ct. of Appeals Guernsey County, 1953),
the court held that the employees were bound by the union contract and
that they had voluntarily quit their employment. The court held that if
compensation were allowed it would abrogate the union contract as to
benefits accruing by reason of seniority. In the case of Barr;ck v. Board
of Review, CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. §8448 (C.P. Mahoning County
#143096, 1954), it was held to be a "voluntary quit," even if the em-
ployer had the right to either close down or to stagger the vacations, due
to provisions of the union contract. The court distinguished the principal
case because in that case the union contract provided for employment
during the vacation period in maintenance work for employees not quali-
fied for a paid vacation, and since this work was denied the claimant, he
was involuntarily unemployed. The court also held that if compensation
were allowed, it would give maximum paid vacations to employees ir-
respective of their qualifications. In Gopp v. Board of Review, CCH
UNEmP. INs. REP. §8416 (C.P. Tuscarawas County, 1954), the union
had been certified as the bargaining agent by the NLRB, and the court
held that since the union was the exclusive bargaining agent of the mem-
bers they were bound by the terms of the contract. The contract in the
Gopp case was held to apply to all the employees, not just to those eligible
for paid vacations. See also Irrels v. Board of Review, CCH UNEMP.
INS. REP. §8313 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, 1952) and Gelock v. O'Neill,
C.P. Mahoning County #136011 (unreported), both of which denied
compensation, and Adams va. Board of Unemp. Comp., CCH UNEMP.
INS. REP. §8384 (C.P. Miami County, 1953) which held employees
ineligible for benefits where they knew of the vacation policy when they
accepted work.
The cases allowing compensation are American Bridge Co. v. Re-
view Board of Indiana, 121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E. 2d 193 (1953),
which held that since the plant was shutdown for inventory, there was no
connection between the stoppage of operation and the union contract and,
therefore, the employee was involuntarily unemployed. See also Golbuski
v. Unemp. Coamp. Board, 171 Pa. Super 634, 91 A. 2d 315 (1952). In
Schettino v..4dministrator of Unemp. Comp., 138 Conn. 253, 83 A. 2d
217 (1951), the company had the choice of the type of vacation period
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and an option to select the date it was to commence, and, therefore, the
layoff was held to be under their control and not a voluntary act of the
employee. Two other cases have regarded the layoff not as a vacation but
as involuntary unemployment and allowed compensation. In re Rakowski,
276 App. Div. 625, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 309 (1950), and Naylor v. Shuron
Optical Co., 281 App. Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S. 2d 775 (1952).
The basic problem in all of these cases is to determine which of the
two tests to apply. The courts which allow compensation tend to look
at the amount of control the employer has over the shutdown and the
availability of the employee for work. The "availability" test is expressed
in the Ohio Compensation Act, OHIO REV. CODE §4141.29(a) (4).
(G.C. 1345-6(A) (4) ). This section states that if an employee is able
and willing to work and has tried to obtain other employment, then he may
receive compensation under the act. The courts that deny compensation
usually follow the "voluntary severance of employment" test which says
that if the employee personally or through his agent (union) willingly
quits his employment, he is not eligible for compensation. See Teple,
Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit, 10 Ohio St. L.J. 191
(1949). Hence there may be conflicting decisions even within the same
state.
Not only is there conflict in regard to the test to be used but also
as to the relationship between the individual member and the union.
Several courts say the unions are the agent for the members in negotiating
collective bargaining agreements. Barnes v. Berry, 169 F. 225 (6th Cir.
1900); Christansen v. Local 680, 126 N.J. Equity 508, 10 A. 2d 168
(1940); Muellerv. Chicago & N.W. Railroad Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259
N.W. 798 (1935). See, Cambridge Glass Co., Adkins v. Bureau of
Unemp. Comp., supra; Gopp v. Board of Review, supra; Arrels v. Bd.
of Review, supra; and 1 TELLER, LABOR DIsPUTES AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING §167-68 (1940). Others view the members as third party
beneficiaries of the union contract. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio
App. 426, 155 N.E. 154 (1926), and Massetta v. National Bronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co., 46 Ohio Op. 20, 107 N.E. 2d 243 (1952),
reversed on other grounds, 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E. 2d 15 (1953).
The Ohio cases holding the employee a third party beneficiary are cases
where the employee is trying to acquire benefits under a contract, while
the cases holding him bound by the provisions of the contract are cases,
similar to the principal case, in which the employee is denying his obligation
under the contract. It would seem then, that in Ohio the employee is
bound as the principal of his bargaining agent by the collective bargaining
agreement.
The minority courts claim that a decision of "no compensation" is a
result of too strict an interpretation of the statute. They say there must
be kept in mind the distressing situation against which the statute is di-
rected. W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Retiew, 129 N.J.L. 402, 20 A. 2d
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858 (1943). These courts also say that the effect of calling the union
the agent of the employee in this situation would be to take away some of
the benefits of an act enacted to give him security. They argue that the
purpose of the act was to transfer the burden of supporting the unemployed
from the taxpayer to the industry which created the unemployment.
Mackey, Unemployment Compensation in Ohio, 5, (1942). On the
other hand, the majority of courts claim that to allow compensation would
undermine the union contract by abrogating the union seniority plan as to
eligibility for paid vacations. They say that the union combines both in-
centive and security for its workers, but sometimes the security must be
sacrified for incentive. Cambridge Glass Co., supra, and Barrick, supra.
An Ohio case has held that to make out proof of a voluntary quit,
the claimant must have intended to terminate the employment and must
have acted to terminate it. Beatty v. Board of Review, 433 Bd. of Re-
view 48, May 17, 1948 (unreported). Applying this to the facts in the
principal case it can 'be said, if it be assumed that it is the Ohio view that
the union is the agent of the members, that the claimant did act to termi-
nate his employment, and that he did intend to terminate his employment
by freely making the union his agent.
In conclusion it would appear that the minority view, as adopted
by the principal case, does not adequately reflect the purpose of the un-
employment compensation act; although it gives security, it disregards the
adverse effect on other provisions of the union contract such as seniority.
David M. Dworken
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERSONAL INJURY-NEUROSIS
Plaintiff received minor injuries when a scaffold on which he and
a fellow worker were working slipped because of a failure of the mecha-
nism supporting it. Plaintiff saved himself by clinging to the cables but he
watched his co-worker fall eight stories to his death. Plaintiff brought
this suit under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, TEx. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306-9 (Vernon 1941), to recover for mental suffering and
loss of income resulting from a severe anxiety state which was brought
about by the results of the accident. He alleged that since his narrow
escape and the ensuing death of his compahion he freezes emotionally on
the scaffold and that this condition has made it impossible for him to
perform the necessary duties of a qualified iron worker. The lower court
held for the plaintiff and awarded him 50 percent permanent partial dis-
ability. On appeal the court of civil appeals held, judgment reversed.
Neurosis solely as the result of fright is not compensable because it did not
result from a physical injury. The statute provides compensation for
employees who sustain disabling injuries in the course of employment and
the act defines "injury" as "damage or harm to physical structure of the
body and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom." The
court felt that this interpretation of the definition of injury does not in-
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clude mental injury as a result of fright. American General Insurance
Co. v. Bailey, -_ Texas __, 268 S.W. 2d 528 (1954).
The court in the principal case mentioned two recent Texas cases
which allowed recovery for neurosis as a disease resulting from an injury
but not as the injury itself: Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. 146
Texas 522, 209 S.W. 2d 345 (1948) and Traders & General Ins. Co.
v. Gibbs, -_ Texas App. _-, 229 S.W. 2d 410 (1950). In both cases the
neurosis was a product of the physical injury, so the court distinguished the
principal case on the grounds that the neurosis in the case at bar was a
result of emotional shock and fright alone.
The historical development of precedent in this field began before
the appearance of workmen's compensation legislation. An early English
case rejected recovery for mental injury alone on the basis that there was
no precedent for maintaining such an action. Victorial Railway Com-
missioners v. Coultas, 57 L.J.P.C. 69, 41 T.L.R. 125 (1888). Another
early American case denied recovery on the grounds that it would be
difficult to approximate the damage in terms of money. Reed v. Ford,
129 Ky. 471, 112 S.W. 600 (1908).
The early view was summarized in an 1896 New York case which
held that fright could not be the basis of an action and no recovery could
be had for any injury resulting from fright. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). One English case, however,
did not follow the strict view but took a more liberal view and allowed
recovery on the facts to a mother who suffered fright when she witnessed
her child in danger of being run over. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B.
141, 94 L.J.K.B. 435 (1925). Other objections against allowing re-
covery for mental injury were that if such recovery were allowed it
would increase litigation to such a degree that the courts would become
overcrowded, and that the physical consequerpces were too remote from
the mental injury. PRossER, Towts §34 (1941).
The three prevailing views used to justify recovery for mental dis-
turbance in an action based on negligence are (1) to allow recovery for
mental injury if it is accompanied by a physical injury, (2) to allow
recovery where physical harm results from a mental disturbance alone
only if there is a physical impact, (3) to allow recovery for physical injury
which results from a mental distuibance without requiring an accompany-
ing physical impact. PRossER, ToRTs §34 (1941). The last view is
followed by only a small minority of courts. The presefit weight of au-
thority in cases where there is only mental distress caused by fright and
no accompanying physical impact is that there can be no recovery. Waube
v. Warvington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). The reasoning
behind these cases is adequately expressed by the following excerpt which
jutified no recovery, the theory being that "damages for a nervous shock
alone could not be regarded as the natural arid reasonable result of negli-
gence on the defendant's part and were therefore too remote to be
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recovered." Penman v. Winnipeg Electric Co., I D.L.R. 497, 500,
(1925) 1 W.W.R. 156, 159, (1925). One or two courts, how-
ever, allow recovery for mental injury when the act was wrongful, wilful,
or intentional, but not when the action is based purely on negligence.
Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Telephone Go., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213, 116 N.E.
2d 819 (1953). See also Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W.
849 (1912) where recovery was allowed for mental injury from a
wilful act of another.
The principal case, however, was brought under a workmen's com-
pensation act and there is no question of negligence under the act because
of the strict liability concept. Under the common law a great proportion
of industrial accidents remained uncompensated and the burden fell on
the workrinan who was the one that could least afford it. Yet about two-
thirds of the states still leave compensation of occupational diseases to the
common law. PROSSER, ToRws §69 (1941). Just as under the common
law, under the statutes there is divided authority on the problem of dis-
eases not attributable to an injury, while other statutes say nothing, leaving
the question to judicial interpretation. PROSSER, TORTS §69 (1941).
There are a number of cases supporting the decision in the prin-
cipal case, one of which, In Re Muggelet, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972
(1917), held that neurosis resulting from a poor posture position while
working was not a personal injury under the act since a disease of the
mind to be compensable, must come from a physical injury. Z9merican
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 59 Ariz. 87, 123 P.
2d 163 (1942) allowed recovery under the workmen's compensation act
on the basis that neurosis resulting from shock caused by accident was a
"disease" resulting from an injury covered by the act. And see Porter v.
W. Horace W'Villiams Go., 9 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1942), where the fact
that the traumatic hysteria condition could be traced directly to a com-
pensable accident gave the plaintiff a right of recovery.
The trend to allow recovery for pure nervous or mental injury which
began with the decision in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., supra, and which
is reflected in a recent decision which allowed recovery for nervous shock
without showing an impact, Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A 2d
923, (1951), has not yet swayed most courts, especially in the field of
workmen's compensation. Ohio follows the stricter view and refuses to
allow recovery on mental shock that is not the direct result of physical
injury. Malone v. Industrial Commission of Ohio 140 Ohio St. 292,
43 N.E. 2d 266 (1943); Industrial Commission v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio
St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1934); Russell v. Industrial Commission, 36
Ohio Op. 493, 78 N.E. 2d 406 (1948).
There are three strong arguments for the adoption of the liberal
view: the first is that recovery should be allowed because of the strict
liability concept of workmen's compensation legislation; the second is
that the increased study of the mind by science shows a connection between
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the causes of physical and mental injury; and the third is merely acknowl-
edging the obsolescence of legal ideas barring recovery in this field.
A short excerpt froni a medical-legal authority will show how far
science has progressed in this field of mental injury. "Fear psychoneuroses
are abnormal mental states ranging in severity from mere feelings of
apprehension to completely disabling psychic illness, induced by psychic
shocks received from events which in some particular were to them fright-
ful. The person, who, following an accident, develops such a state may
have suffered a mild or moderate physical injury or none at all; he may
merely have witnessed it. . . . It should, however, be considered as the
consequence of the antecedent accident only when circumstances sur-
rounding the latter were horrible, frightful, or shocking." REED &
EMERSON, THE RELATioN BErTWEEN INJURY AND DrsnAsE, 438
(1938 ed.).
If we acknowledge that there are physical reactions to a mental
shock and that there is no clear line of demarcation between mental and
physical injury as stated in, Mall, Personal Injury Resulting from Shock,
5 JBA Kan. 303 (1937), then with the progress that science is making in
studying both damage to mind and body, the law, it seems obvious, must
also progress and throw off the shackles of antiquated precedent. The
principal case followed the precedent in the state of Texas which has
interpreted the Texas Workmen's Compensation Statute as excluding
neurosis from compensable damages. Either the statutes which exclude
neurosis as a basis for compensable damages should be amended to cover
such an injury, or the courts when interpreting the statutes should read
in mental disease and so follow the liberal trend. When this is done the
words phobia and neurosis will then become part of the law of damages
as much as the word trauma, whether they be under a workmen's com-
pensation statute or in a tort action.
David M. Dworken
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